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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
C.A.RL XEI..JSON DAY,

Plaintiffs and Appellant,
J. GEORGE JONES, JR., and
~IRS. J. GEORGE JONES, Jr.,
his wife, whose true and correct
name is otherwise unknown,

Case No. 746G

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District
Court of 1\Iillard County, Utah, Ron. Will L. Hoyt,
Judge presiding. The judgment of the trial court dismissed this action against the defendant, Mrs. George J~
Jones, Jr.; ·and awarded judgment against the defendant, .J. George Jones, Jr., for the sum of $1.00 and costs.
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Plaintiff by his complaint seeks compensatory and
exemplary damages for the alleged conversion of wheat.
The statement of facts in plaintiff's brief encompasses more of his contentions than of actual facts. Respondents will therefore first state the facts of the case
and then point out to the Court some of the pertinent
misstatements of appellant. It is believed this will be
more coherent and will minimize confusion.
For clarity it should be here noted that this case is
the outgrowth of a previous case (Day v. Jones, 112 Utah
286, 187 Pac. (2d) 181, Case No. 7062) wherein this plaintiff was plaintiff, and these defendants were defendants.
On or about May 22nd, 1940, plaintiff purchased certain real property in l\!illard County, Utah, (Finding No.
1, ~ecord Pages 46-47).
On or about May 28th, 1943, the defendant J. George
Jones, Jr., procured a quit claim deed to said preniises
from Millard County, (Finding No. 2, ~ecord Page 47).
To avoid repitition of names, except as hereinafter otherwise noted, the defendant, J. George Jones, Jr., will be
denominated the· defendant, and "There ,his 'vife is re ·
ferred to it will be specified.
Some three years later, and on or about July 15th,
l~J16, plaintiff commenced action to quiet title to the
said premises against the defendants, and summons was
served (Finding No. 3, Record Page 47).
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3
- Before the said action 'Yns tried and determined, and
in the fall of 1946, the said defendant prepared the premises for planting and planted a crop of wheat thereon.
(Finding No.4, Record Page .:17).
After such planting of grain the case came on for
trial. The said defendant raised the issue of reimbursement for improvements made, including the planted crdps
hereinbefore mentioned, and for other expenditures. On
~Iareh 12th, 1946, the trial court made and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a decree quieting
title whereby the trial court determi~ed and adjudged
that plaintiff was the owner of and entitled to the immediate possession of the said lands and premises, and the
improvements made thereon including the said, growing
crop of wheat. The matter of the rights and claims of
the defendant against the plaintiff in the lands and improvements, inc-luding the growing crop of wheat, was
presented to the trial court for determination in the trial
of said acj:ion and was litigated. (Findings Nos. 5, 6 and
7, Record Page 47).
The defendant perfected an appeal to this Court, and
desiring to remain in possession of the said premises
pending the appeal applied to the trial court for a stay
of execution. The trial court affixed the amount of the
supersedeas bond, increased later on application of
plaintiff, the bond was filed, and a stay of execution was
entered and remained in full force and effect thereafter.
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It is to be noted that the trial court in this action also
found ''That the said defendant, J. George Jones, Jr.,
after the entry of the decree aforesaid, remained in possession of the said premises under and by virtue of an
order made by said trial_ court * * ; that prior to and
after the making of said order staying exe.cution, no
process of any kind issued in said cause under which the
plaintiff was ordered placed in possession of said premises, or under which said defendant was deprived of the
possession thereof." (Finding No. 11, Record Page 49).
>)(<

Prior to the commencement of the action to quiet
title said defendant was in possession of the premises
and remained in possession while said action was pending.

About three days after the trial court eNtered its

decree quieting title the plaintiff, without having applied
for or procured from anyone any process placing him in
possession o.f the premises, went on the property in the
temporary absence of the ·defendant and his representative, no one -excepting the plaintiff being present, observed the condition of the crops growing on the land,
made some minor repairs to the fence and observed that
some of the ditches were filled up; that four days later
he again went on the land and was repairing fences; that
defendant's representative approached him, and told
him there were instructions to keep him off the land; at
that time the said representatives were ·Carrying pitchforks and 'vere belligerent in attitude. The plaintiff
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thereupon left the prope:rty. The plaintiff was not eject-·
ed or removed from the premises, unless the above constituted an ejectment, and thereafter defendant remained
in possession until the case 'Yas determined by this Court.
(Finding No. 8, Record Page 47).
In July of 1947 the defendant harvested and sold the
crops. (Finding No.9, Record Page· No. 48). This Court
decided the appeal on November 24th, 1947, _a re~ittitur
issued December 16th, 1947, and about the same time defendant gave up possession. (Findings Nos. 12 and 8,_
Record Pages 48-49).
''The said crop of wheat had a fluctuating market
value; that said crop had a peak or high market value
of $2.55 per bushel, or a total value of $6,078.38, on or
about the 24th day of January, 1948." (Finding No. 10,
Record Page 48).
"That the defendant .J. George Jones, Jr., was and
is not guilty of any evil motive or malicious_ conduct
either in the pursuing of his appeal to· the Supreme Court
as aforesaid, or in procuring a stay of execution, or in
remaining in possession of said premises pending such
appeal, or in the harvesting and disposal of said crop of
grain." (Finding No. 13, Record Page 49).
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence in the -case,
each defendant separately moved the trial court to grant
the plaintiff judgment against each of them for such nom-
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inal damages as .he might see fit and for costs of court,
or in alternative, an order of non-suit.
The trial court dismissed the action as against the
wife, and awarded judgment against the defendant J.
George Jones, Jr., for $1.00 and costs of court.
As we observed at the outset of this statement of
facts, it was necessary for respondents to make a detailed
statement because the plaintiff's statement of fact in his
brief is argumentative, contrary to the record in the case,
and in many instances confuses the allegations of his
complaint and his conte~tions with the facts in the case.
He also sets· forth in great detail many facts encompassed
within the previous case, and which ·are immaterial to a
determination of this action.
It is not particularly material or important, but at
Page 7 of plaintiff's brief he stated as a fact that ''defendants, by and through their agents and employees, did
belligerently and by show of force eject and remove the
plaintiff from his lands and preDJises and did re-enter
and 'resume' possession thereof," whereas this ·is contrary to Finding :No. 8 of the trial court, (Record Page
48). Defendant also urges that the defendant did not
''reassume possession.'' On the contrary, the defendant
J. George Jones, Jr., was never legally ousted .or out of
possession.
Plaintiff, commencing with the paragraph at the bot-
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tom of Pag·e 8 of his brief, states that "All of the actions
of the said defendants relating to the said crop of grain
were 'vi.llful, "'"rongful, malicious, unlawful, fraudulent,
,vith full knowledge in them of the plaintif's ownership
of and claim to the said land and the said crop, with full
knowledge in them of the commencement of the said
action, of the pendency thereof and of the judgment and
decree of the court therein, 'vith wanton disregard of
the plaintiff's rights therein, 'vithout the consent of the
plaintiff or any rig·htful authority whatever, without
good faith, but with evil intention to take unconscientious
advantage of the plaintiff (Transcript p. 9, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, and 44) . "
The trial court found to the contrary as follows :
"That the defendant J. George Jones, Jr., was
and is not guilty of any evil motive or malicious
conduct either in the pursuing of his appeal to the
Supreme Court as aforesaid, or in procuring a stay
of execution, or in remaimng in possession of said
premises pending- such appeal, or in the harvesting
and disposal of said crop of grain.,-, (Finding No.
/
13, R\ecord Page 49.)
Plaintiff also states as a fact that he has been damaged in the gross amount for which the grain was sold
and f~r $3",000.00 exemplary damages, (Page 9, Plaintiff's Brief), whereas this was the very question to be
determined by the trial court and is the very question
now to be determined bv this Honorable Court.
of

-
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PREI.JIMINARY STATEMENT
The plaintiff in his brief has ignored the basis and
the grounds upon which the trial court predicated its
dismissal as to the defendant wife and its judgment for
$1.00 and costs against the defendant, J. George Jones,
Jr. · Defendants believe this case will be more readilv
understood by this Court if we first present the questions as they were presented to and ruled on by the trial
court, and then discuss the ''Points for Reversal'' as they
are raised by the plaintiff.
oi

The ultimate question before this Court for determination is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the
action as to 1\frs. J. George Jones, Jr., and erred in
awarding plaintiff nominal damages against J. George
Jones, Jr.
The real question respecting Mrs. J. George Jones,
Jr., is whether or not the record discloses any basis of
liability against her.
The real question .respecting J .. George Jones, Jr.,
IS: Is the plaintiff, under the facts and circumstances
of this case, entitled to recover the highest fluctuating
market value of the wheatf And is he entitled to exemp·
lary. damages f Defendant J. George Jones, Jr., may
argue that the true measure of damages is ''the value of
the use and occupation of the property from the time of
the appeal until the delivery of possession thereof, not
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exceeding the amount of the undertaking in that regard~'
as fixed by the supersedeas bond; or he might argue
that the true measure of damages is the value of the use
and occupation of ~aid land (rental value) without regard to the statute respecting supersedeas bonds or the
terms thereof; or he might argue that the true measure
of damag·es is the sale price of the wheat, less the costs
(from the entry of the decree quieting title) of cultivation, irrigation, harvesting, cost or reasonable value of
providing water, since there was no "\Vater 'vith the land;
or he might argue some other basis. It is not necessary
for this Court to determine what the true measure of
damages might be. The sole question for determination
is: Is plaintiff entitled to recover the highest fluctuating .
price, and is he entitled to exemplary damages~

POINTS FOR ARGUl\IENT
A. The trial court properly dismissed the action as
to Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr., there being nothing in the
record disclosing any basis for liability against her.
B. Plaintiff was not entitled to recover the highest
fluctuating peak or market value of the crop of wheat.
C. The trial court properly awarded judgment for
nominal damages against J. George Jones, Jr.
D. Defendants' answer to plaintiff's ''Points for Reversal,'' the plaintiff's points being as follows:
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.1. Possession of premises by defendants at
time crop harvested immat~rial as defendants'
rights and claims in crop were res judicata.

2. Possession of premises by defendants at
time crop harvested immaterial as defendants'
rights and claims in crop were barred by statute.
3. Possession of premises by defendants at
time crop harvested immaterial as defendants'
rights and claims in crop were lost and barred by
plaintiff's taking possession of premises while crop
growing thereon.
4. Effect of supersedeas bond is solely to stay
enforcement of judgment and does not nullify, void
or suspend the judgment.
5. Action in trover for conversion or in nature
of action on the case.
6. Disposal of subject of action pending appeal
is contempt of both trial and appellate courts.
8. Plaintiff entitled to exemplary damages by
reason of the willful, wanton, malicious and 'vrongful nature of defendants' actions.

ARGUl\fENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE ACTION AS TO MRS. J. GEORGE JONES, JR.,
THERE BEING NO B A S I S FOR LIABILITY
AGAINST HER DISCLOSED BY THE RECORD.
This point will be disposed of very briefly. Neither
the record in the case of Day v. Jones, 112 Utah 286, 187
P_ac. (2d) 181, Case No. 7062, nor the record in this case
discloses that Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr., was in any way
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invoh~ed

in buying- the lnnd from l\fillard County, Utah,
in farming the crop or SlJlling the \\Theat. Plaintiff wishes
to predicate liability as to her merely because she was
the "-ife of the defendant, tT. George Jones, Jr. It is
true that her name is mentioned in the supersedeas bond
filed pending appeal in the other case and if liability had
been predicated on the supersedea~ bond then she would
have incurred liability, limited, '"'e contend to the amounts
of the bonds, and based upon liability for use and occupation of the premises as specified in the bond. Plaintiff
in this case doP.s not set forth a cause of action based
upon use and occupation, nor are any damages proved
from which an a'Yard against her might be made on that
basis. On the basis of conversion J\!Irs. J.· George Jones,
Jr., took no action 'Yhatever and incurred no liability.

PLAINTIF:B., \~VAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE I-IIGHEST FijUCTUATING PEAK OR
1IARKET VALUE OF THE CROP OF WHEAT.
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to recover the
highest peak or market value of the crop of wheat. Defendant contends that he is liable only for the value of
the use and occupation of the land with growing crops
thereon from the time of the entry of the decree quieting
title to the time when he relinquished possession, limited
ho,vever to the amount of the supersedeas bond (later an
additional bond was required and furnished) ; or, disregarding the amount of the supersedeas bond, that his lia-
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bility is limited to such use and occupation.
Ther-e is one case, and one alone, in the entire Pacific
jurisdiction which is flatly in point. It is the comparatively recent case of Amberg v. Claussen, 98 Pac. (2d) 927.
The facts in the Amberg v. Claussen case are practically identical with the facts in the case at bar. In that
case the defendant acquired a tax title to land theretofore owned by plaintiff; the plaintiff commenced an
action to set the tax ti tie aside; the trial court cancelled
the tax deeds and awarded possession of the premises to
plaintiff; the defendant appealed from that portion of
the judgment cancelling the tax title and awarding possession of the premises to plaintiff. The. defendant executed and filed a supersedeas bond and execution was
stayed; thereafter the judgment of the trial court was
affirmed on appeal. Plaintiff then commenced an action
to recover on said supersedeas bond. The plaintiff took
the position that the proper measure of recovery was the
rents and profits collected from the land. The court
held th_at even though the supersedeas bond was not conditioned exactly within the terms of the Oklahoma statute
(which is similar to Section 104-41-11, U.C.A. 1943) the
terms of the bond governed. In other words, the Court
in the Amberg v. Claussen case held that the measure of
liability where stay of execution is had after the filing
of a supersedeas bond, is limited to the terms of the bond
itself. Surely, it would in any event be limited to either
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the terms of the bond or the measure of liability set forth
in the statute. (See Section 104-41-11, U.C.A. 1943).
Respecting the question as to ""hether or not defendant's possession, after the entry of the decree, was
wrongful the Court held :
''Defendant, in a strict sense, 'vas not, after
the filing of said bond, wrongfully occupying· the
land. He had a right to occupy and continue in
possession, not because he was the owner or had
the lawful right to occupy the land before giving ·
the bond, but because the law gave him that right.
By this bond, in the nature of a contract, he acquired the right, by reason of the promise of defendants, in the bond, to pay for the privilege, in
case the judgment_ against him for possession
should be affirmed. ''
Throughout his brief, plaintiff 1n the case at bar
takes the position that the defendant's possession, after
.the entry of the decree quieting title and until the decision on appeal, was wrongful; defendant insists it was
rightful; that the right was given him under the statute;
that the sole remedy of plaintiff is on the bond, and his
limit of liability is the amount of the bond.
How can defendant's possession, after the entry of
the decree quieting title, be wrongful when it is u~der a
Court order giving him the right to maintain possession
after the entry of the decree~ As we view it, defendant
was entitled to appeal from the decree quieting title as a
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matter of right (there is no suggestion that the appeal
was without merit); the statute gives him the right to
remain in possession pending the appeal under a stay of
execution, upon furnishing a supersedeas bond, and the
statute states the measure of damages. Surely it cannot
be argued that a defendant is 'vrongfully in possession if
he is in possession under the Court's stay of execution,
the stay of execution giving him the legal right to remain
in possession.
What is the liability under the statute and the bonds
in this case' The statute in Utah heretofore cited and
the bonds in this case fix the defendant's liability "to the
effect that during the possession of such property by the
appellant he will not commit, or suffer to be committed,
any waste thereon, and that if the judgment is affirmed
or the appeal dismissed, he will pay the value of the use
and occ11-pancy of the property from the time of the appeal
until the delivery of the possession thereof and for any
"\\Taste committed thereon pursuant to the judgment or
order, not exceeding a s1tm to be fixed by the Judge of
the Court by which the judgment was rendered or order
made, and which must be specified in the undertaking.''
Plaintiff introduced no proof whatever respecting
the measure of damages to which he was entitled under
the statute and the bond, and the trial court could not do
otherwise than find:
''That the plan tiff has presented to this court
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no competent proof 'Ylu1 teYer of damages to which
plaintiff claims to be entitled, and that the sole evid~nce and proof pertaining to or respecting damages claimed by plaintiff is as set forth in findings
Nos. 9 and 10 herein.'' (Finding No. 14, Record
Page 50).
Under such a finding plaintiff, having properly
stated a cause of action, and there being no competent
proof as to damages, 'Yas clearly entitled to a judgment
for nominal damages.
But even assuming the ph~intiff was not limited to
the measure of damages fixed by the statute and bond,
still under the authorities he is not entitled to recover the
damages alleged and claimed by him.
The trial court at ·one period in this litigation relied
on the authorities cited in 17 C. J. 381, Section 7.

''CROPS RAISED BY TRESPASSER. * * *
But one who sows, cultivates, and harvests a crop
upon the land of another is entitled to the crop as
against the o"\vner of the land, whether he came to
the possession of the land lawfully or not, provided
he remains in possession till the crop is harvested.''
17 C. J. 381, Section 7.
"CROP RAISED BY TRESPASSER. * * *
On the other hand, one who sows, cultivates and
harvests a crop on the land of another is entitled
to the crop as against the owner of the land, whether he came to- the possession of the land lawfully
or not, provided he remains in possession until the
crop is harvested, but, if such person abandons pos-
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session of the land, or is dispossessed under a legal
writ before the crop is matured and severed from
the soil, it then becomes the property gf the owner
of the land." 25 C.J.S Crops, Section 8.
It cannot be contended that defendant did not sow,
cultivate and harvest the crop of wheat in the case at bar,
nor can it be contended that he abandoned possession or
was dispossessed under a legal writ prior to severance.
It seems under the authorities that this defendant became the actual owner of the crop after severance and
it is elementary that one cannot convert pers-onalty which
he then owns. Far from being dispossessed under a legal
writ prior to maturity, the only legal writ in this case
(stay of execution) expressly gave defendant the right
to possess.
Yet even if defendant was a mere trespasser he be-·
came the owner of crops when severed. He cannot be
held liable for conversion of the crops, but he can be held
liable for the value of use and occupation of the real estate in the condition it was when the decree quieting title
was entered by the trial court, and this would take into
consideratiol) that the land had growing crops thereon.
Defendant freely concedes that the value of the use and
occupation of the land was enhanced by the growing
crops. Still, this would not place title to the severed
crops in the plaintiff, and defendant cannot be held liable
for conversion.
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Peacock v. B'radsha~o, 293 Pac. 982, is a case where
defendant claimed title to land but an adverse decision
was rendered by the trial court. Defendant furnished
the statutory appeal bond and appealed to the Supreme
C~urt. Decision "~as affirmed. The Supreme Court of
Idaho ably reviews the dec_isions of various jurisdictions
and we respectfully refer this Court to the entire opinion
as being decisive in this case. In brief, the case holds,
under facts similar to the case at bar, that:
1. The o"rner of the land is not the owner of
the severed crops ;
2. The owner of land can recover the rents and
profits;
f

3. The above _is true even where possession is
without any right whatever;
4. The proper reme9-y is for wrongful withholding of possession, and not for the crop
or the wrongful conversion of the crop.

We quote the following_ most pertinent portions of
the case because they reflect the universal holdings of
all Courts in the Western jurisdictions :
'' rrhe Washington court in Fuglede v. W enatchee Dist. Co-op. Ass 'n., 134 Wash. 350, 235 P. 790>
792, 39 A.L.R 953, recently examined the law relative to property rights in severed crops as between
a claimant wrongfully in possession, while the
crops were grown and severed, and one who was entitled to possession but out of possession until
after the crops were severed. The Fuglede action
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was not for the landlord's portion, nor did it .involve the whole crop. It involved a balance of crop
proceeds after deducting advancements to the
actual grower for groV\ring and harvesting. After
exhaustively examining and discussing the authorities, that court adopted the rule announced in Page
v. Fowler, 39 (jal. 412, 2 . A.m. Rep. 462, as follows:
'It is undoubtedly true that, at common law, a person who had been ouHted from land might, after a
recovery and re-entry, maintain his action of tresspass for the mesne profits and for waste for the
reason that after re-entry the law supposes he has
al\\Tav-s been seized and the acts of the defendant
\vcre a continuous tresspass upon the rightful possession of the plaintiff; but· no case has been cited
in which this principle has been held to make the
owner of the land out of possession, under such
circumstances, the o'vner of the crops grown and
actually harvested by the defendant. The very fact
that he 1nay recorer the rents and profits· of the
land, shotos that he cannot recorer the crops.**'"
''Later in the opinion the court quoted from
the case of Brothers v. Hurdle, 32 N. C. 490, 51 Am.
Dec. 400; as folloV\rs : 'But when one V{ho is in the
adverse possession gathers a crop in the course of
husbandry, or scycrs a tree or other thing from
the land, the thing SeYCred becomes a chattel, but
it does not become the property of the o'vner of
the land; for ,his title is divested--he is out of pos-.
session, and has no ·right to the immediate possession of the thing,. nor could he bring any action
until he regains possession. * * * The otDner of the
la·nd cannot sue for th f' thing· serered in trorer or
detinue as a chatt~l; for it is not his chattfJl-it did
not b~come so at the tim.e it tuas serer'ed, and the
title to it as a chattel ranunt pass to hhn aftf'r1unril~
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lthen he rcgaius the possessiou, or by force of the

jus postliJni,Jrii.' "
''The :!\fontana Co~1rt, in }(ester Y. Amon, 81
:Jiont. 1, 261 P. ~88, 29~, citing Fuglede v. Wenatchee Co-op.. ..:-\..ss 'n., supra, announced tl;l.e rule as
follo"~s: · 'fhe o'vnership of crops raised on land
held adYerst~ly dops not·depend npon the ownership
of the land, or the right to the possession thereof,
but upon 'vho "ras in the actual physical possession,
and o'vnership and th_e right to -possession are not
in issue in an action involving the o'vnership of the
crops.· ''
~ '\V"'" e

think the Idaho court has disposed of the
question inYolved, in Fritcher v. Kelley, 34 Idaho
4G8, 201 P. 1037. That case, like the case at bar,
'Yas the outgrowth of a case 'vherein a deed had
been canceled. In Fritcher Y. ICelley, the deed had
been canceled on the groun!l of mental incompetency. The action 'vas against both ~he grantee _in
the deed and the crop tenant to restrain the removing of a crop that had been severed. Relief was
denied agaiust either the landlord or tenant, the
court stating in the opinion: 'Appellant claims
that the crops were part of the realty and as such
belonged to him. They "rere all fructus industriales; _that is, crops produced by labor and industry.
\V e> approve the rule that fructus industriales belong to one "rho, while in possession of the land,
has raised them and se\''ered them from the land
itself, though it turn out that -his possession was
'"'ithout right as against the true owner of the land.
* * * TV e conr.Zude that this -rule holds good, even
as to that part o.f the crops ~vhi,ch 1vere not severed
br.fnrf fhf jud[Jr;nent, so long as they were severed
'1f'h il e respondents 1re rr i11 pnssr ssi on o.f the land.' "
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"(2 3) rrhe rule is quite universal that as
between' one out of possession, though the owner,
and entitled to possession, and one adversely in
possession, while crops are grown and severed, the
title to the entire crop is in the latter. Fritcher v.
Kelley, supra; !{ester v. Amon, supra; Fuglede v.
Wenatchee Co-op~ Ass 'n., supra; Grossman v. Yip
Wing, 62 Cal. App. 121, 216 P. 634; Rector v. Lewis,
46 Cal. App. 168, 188 P. 1018; Rathbone v. Boyd,
30 Kan. 485, 2 P. 664; Phillips v. Keysaw, 7 Okl.
67 4, 56 P. 695; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392, 256
P. 80, 57 A.L.R. 578. The authorities quite as generally recognize a remedy, but it is always for the
wrongful withholding of possession; never for the
crop or wrongful conversion of the crop in which
the landowner had no title. Gross v. Robinson,
supra; Grossman v. Yip Wing, supra; Pennybecker
v. McDougal, 46 Cal. 661; Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal.
· 412, 2 Am. Rep. 462; Groome v. Almstead, 101 Cal.
425, 35 P. 1021; Stockwell v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 363,
90 Am. Dec. 710. ''
The plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to the
many cases cited in the Peacock v. Bradshaw case.
Kester v. Amon, 261 Pac. 288, is identical in principle
with the case at bar and we quote pertinent portions from
that case:

6. Analagous to the above principle is the
rule that 'where a mere intruder upon lands plants
crops thereon, such crops, as long as they remain
unsevered, are the property of the owner of the
land.' 17 C.J. 381, and cases cited. But"7. In either case the sub modo ownership
may be defeated by the planter of the crops harSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
vesting them, 'vhen ripe, and thus appropriating
to himself, as owner, that which he planted and cultivated. Power ~lerc. Co. v. Moore Mere. Co.,
above.
"(5) 8. A corollary to the above principles is
the doctrine, of almost universal application, that
when an occupant of lands plants, cultivates, and
harYests crops during the term of his occupation,
they are his personal property, 'vhether he occupied the land as a purchaser' a tenant, or a mere
trespasser holding the land adversely to the real
owner, and whether he came into the possession of
the land lawfully or not, provided he remain in possession until after the crops are harvested. 17 C.J.
381 ; Shamlian v. Wells, 197 Cal. 716, 242 P. 483 ;
Lynch v. Sprague Roller Mills Co., 51 Wash. 535~
99 P. 578; Smith v. Howell, 91 Or. 279, 176 P. 805;
Story v. Lang, 87 Kan. 727, 125 P. 72; First Nat.
Bank v. Montana Emporium Co., 59 Mont. 584, 197
P. 994."
''The fact that the statute declares that the
owner may recover the value of the use and occupation of his land precludes the idea of his right to
recover the crops or their value, which include, not
only the value of the use of the land, but also the
value of the seed planted and the time and labor of
the one who plants and cultivates the land. Woodcock v. Carlson, 41 1\Iinn. 542, 43 N. W. 479; Stockwell v. Phelps, 34 N. Y. 363, 90 Am.- Dec. 710; Johnson v. Fish, 105 Cal. 420, 38 P. 979, 45 Am. St. Rep.
53; Groome v. Olmstead, 101 Cal. 425, 35 P. 1021.''
Rector v. Le1vis, 188 Pac. 1018, is a case where the
Court expressly stated that:

The legal question presented is whether de-
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fendants can recover as damages for the use and
·occupation of their land during the time it was lawfully detained by the plantiff the gross value of the
crop raised thereon by plaintiff. It is insisted by
appellant that in no event could the recovery be
for more than the value after deducting the cost of
growing and harvesting the crop, and that the true
measure of damages is not the crops grown on the
land, but the rental value of the premises.''
The Court, in Rector v. Lewis case, held that the
crops harvested by one in unlawful possession belonged
to him, and ''the owner's remedy is to recover the rental
value of the land.'' Can it be said that the liability of one
rightfully in possession under a stay of execution would
be greater than the liability of one in unlawful possession 1 In the case at bar the rental value would be predicated upon the land with growing crops thereon to which
this plaintiff was entitled under the decree quieting title.
"If Zahar had entered upon said land and
harvested the crop on his own account, he would
have been entitled to the harvested crop, for it is
well settled that the owner of ·land has no right or
title to crops raised on the land by one not in privity
with him and severed 'vhile he is out of possession.
Rector v. Lewis, 46 Cal. -App. 168, 188 P. 1018; Bethea v. J effe-ts, 12·6 Ark. 194, 189 S. W. 666; L.R.A.
1918A, 549, p52, and note; 8 R~ C. L. 366; 8 Cal.
Jur~ 688. But coincident with his right to retain
the severed crops is his Iiabili ty to the owner for
damages, the measure of which is the value of the
use and possession of the land while he was in possession. Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412, citing Page
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Fowler, 37 Cal. 100; Groome v. Alm~tead, 101
Cal. 425, 35 P. 1021; Johnson v. Fish, 105 Cal. 420,
38 P. 979, 45 Am. St. Rep. 53; Rector v. Lewis,
supra, 168; 8 Cal. Jr. 689." Shamlian v. Wells, 242
Pac. 483.

Y.

See also J oh11son v. P1ish, 38 Pac. 979, and· Lynch v.
Sprague !loller J.llills, 99 Pac. 578.
Whether this Court "\vould hold, if the question were
before it, that the defendant is liable for the use and occupation of the premises, limited to the ·amount of the supersedeas bond, w·hich is the holding in the Amberg v. Claussen case, or that the defendant is liable for use and occupation 'vithout the limitation of the supersedeas bond,
need not be now determined. But. it is readily apparent
that without exception the. courts of the Pacific jurisdiction universally hold that in cases identical in principle
with the case at bar the plaintiff cannot recover the highest fluctuating peak or market .value of the severed crops
in an action for conversion; that the plaintiff is not the
O"\vner of the severed crops; that ownership of and title
to the severed crops are in the defendant.
Parenthetically, defendant observes that even though
defendant might be liable for conver~ion of growing
crops, and if he were liable at all in conversion it would
be of growing and not severed crops, the measure of damages is properly stated thusly:
''In an action in conversion involving a crop of
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ure of damages, and evidence should be required
as to the cost of putting such crop in shape for
market." Ilazelwood v. Jenkins, 205 Pac. 1038,
syl. 2.

THE TRIAI.J COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
JUDGl\IENT FOR NOl\IINAL DAMAGES AGAINST
J. GEORG·E JONES, JR.
The only proof of damages shown by the. record is
well stated in Finding No. 10 (Record Page 48) of the
trial court, as follows:
''That. said crop of wheat had a fluctuating
market value; that said crop had a peak or high
market value of $2.55 per pushel, or a total value
of $6,078.38, on or about the 24th day of January,
1948. ''
The trial court also found (Finding No. 14, Record
Page 50):
''That the plaintiff has presented to this court
no competent proof whatever of damages to which
plaintiff claims to be entitled, and that the sole evidence and proof pertaining to or respecting damages claimed by plaintiff is. as set forth in findings
Nos. 9 and 10 herein."
Defendant has previously shoWn that the highest
peak or market value of the crop was not and is not the
correct legal measure of damages.
Under such circumstances it is the universal
and one followed by this Court, that:
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·'There being no adequate or competent evidence to support the judgment for damages, a
judgment for no more than nominal damages can
be sustained. The legal right 'of respondent having· been infringed upon by appellant the law presumes damages, but since the -amount of actual
damages is not shown by competent evidence a
judgment for $1 nominal damages is all that may
be sustained. The decree should be amended in this
particular.'' Bigler v. Fryer, 82 Utah 380, 25 Pac.
( 2d) 598, 601.
''As noted in Section 6 supra, a presumption
of at least nominal damages follows from proof of
a legal wrong. However, the amount and items of
pecuniary damage are not presumed, but must be
proved; and if there is no evidence as to the extent
of the pecuniary loss there can be no recovery of
substantial damages, at least where the elements
of damage are such as to be susceptible of pecuniary admeasurement. The burden of proving the
fact and amount of pecuniary damage is on the
party asserting the damage, particularly in the
ca~e of damages which are uncertain or have not
been admitted; and such party, has the burden of
showing his damages by evidence which is competent and which furnishes a basis for their assessment in accordance with the -measure of damages
properly applicable.'' 25 C.•J.S. Damages, Section
144, Page 788.
~ee

also· 17 C. J. 1023.

"ABSENCE OF PROOF AS TO ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
Nominal damages may be recovered where a
cause of action for a legal wrong is established,
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but there is no proof of actual damages.
Although the law presumes damage from the
infringem~nt of a legal right, as stated supra Section 6, the amount of damage so presumed is only
nominal; hence, as· stated in Corpus Juris, which
has been quoted with approval, where a legal
wrong is established but there is no_ evidence as to
actual darnages, nominal damages are properly
awarded. In other words, where plaintiff establ,ishes a cause of action but fails to show any damage, he rnay recover nominal damages." 25 C.J.S.
Damages, Section 9, page 466.
''Where plaintiff establishes a wrong and
actual loss therefrom he is entitled to nominal damages at least, although the actual damages are not
susceptible of being exactly ascertained, as where
the evidence fails to show the extent of the resulting damages, or fails to furnish the facts as a basis
for computing the damages under the rule applicable thereto; * * * '' 25 C.J .S. Damages, Section
12, Page 469.

''ACTUAL DA1\1:AGE UNCERTAIN OR UNASCERTAINABI.~E. \Vhere plaintiff establishes
a wrong and actual loss therefrom he is entitled to
nominal damages at least, although the actual dam-ages are not susceptible of being exactly·· ascertained, or are so small that they cannot readily be
estimated. In such cases if plaintiff evidently has
sustained some damage and the jury being unable
to ascertain the amount finds a verdict for defendant, the court will permit plaintiff to enter a verdict for nominal damages. As a corollary to this
rule, where it is sho,vn that plaintiff has suffered
damages but fr~m the nature of the case they can- _
not be shown with reasonable cert~inty, only nom-
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inal damages are recoYerable. ''
·61, Page 725.

17 C.J. Section

Woods v. Ft. Smith & Tlr. Ry. (~o. et al., 219 Pac. 650,
is a case flatly in point respecting the point that plaintiff
was entitled to and should haYe been awarded nominal
damages. The syllabus (No. 1) succinctly states the law:

''In an action on tort, \Yhere a breach of duty
1s sho\Yn and the amount of the resulting injury
is not sho,v-n, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
nominal damages, and it is error to sustain a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence because the testimony is insufficient to show the amount of the
damages sustained. ' '
The Court in its opinion said:
''There was evidence in the record showing
that the growing crops belonging to_ the plaintiff
were destroyed by the overflow, and, while the testimony sho,vs that the land was farmed by tenants,
it fails to show except in one instance what portion
of the growing crops belonged to the landlord and
what portion belonged to the tenant, and, while
there was not sufficient evidence from which the
jury could have properly ascertained the actual
damages sustained by the plaintiff to his growing
crops, we are of the opinion that it was error for
the court to sustain- a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence. There was evidence tending to show negligence on the part of defendant, and there was
evidence sho,ving that by reason thereof the plaintiff had been damaged. In these circumstances, upon
the failure of the plaintiff to introduce evidence
front ~vhirh the ,jury could determine the amount
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of the damages,· plaintiff was entitled to recover
nominal damages. The plaintiff was entitled to
recover for the destruction of the growing crops
the value of his portion of such crops in the condition in which they were at the time of the destruction, and, before a recovery of actual damages
wou.ld have been justified, it would have been
necessary for the plaintiff to prove what portion
of the crop belonged to him and to have introduced
some evidence from which the value of-the crop in
its condition at the time of the destruction could
have been determined."

In vVoods v. Ft. Smith case the plaintiff recovered
nothing, and it was reversed o~ appeal, it being held that
nominal damages should have been awarded. This is true
because:
''Some damages are always presumed 'to follow from violation of _any right of duty implied by
law, which will award nominal damages in such
cases, if none greater are proved~'' Smith v. Pallay,
279 Pac. 279.
In Call v. Coiner, 251 Pac. 617, identical in principle
with the case at bar, evidence as to the correct measure
of damages was wholly lacking. The jury awarded nominal damages only and this award was upheld on appeal.
The Court held :
''The jury either had to guess blindly or award
nominal damages, which latter they logically· did."
That is exactly the situation in the case at bar.
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There 'Yas absolutely no competent or any evidence from
'vhich the trial court could ascertain the amount of damages to "\Yhich plaintiff might be legally entitled. The
trial court would have been compelled to guess blindly,
or a,,. . ard the nominal ·damages which he prope~ly
a'varded.
See also JlcGztire r. TV'hite, 11 Pac. (2d) 698, and
Franklin v. Shure, 237 Pac. 461.

ANS\v'ER TO PL~t\.INTIFF 'S CONTENTION
THAT "POSSESSION OF PREl\1ISES BY DEFENDANTS AT TI~IE CROP WAS IIARVESTED IMMATERIAL AS DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS AND CLAil\I
IN CROP WERE RES ADJUDICATA."
Plaintiff insists that the defendants' rights in the
crop of wheat were res adjudicata. This might perhaps
be more correct if Vire added the word ''growing'' so that
he were contending that the defendants' rights in the
crop of growing wheat were res adjudicata. All that the
decree quieting title settled was the plaintiff's ownership
and right to possession of land with growing crops thereon. As we have previously noted in the brief, under the
case of Antberg v. Claussen, supra, defendant had a right
to possession of the premises with·· the growing crop
thereon when he furnished a supersedeas bond and the
court made and entered a stay of execution. Under all
of the authorities heretofore cited, when the crops were
grown and severed title 'vas in the defendants, and plain-
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tiff was relegated to damages for the use and occupation
of the land. Whether the .amount of such damages could
exceed the amount of the supersedeas bond we need not
here determine.
The authorities cited by the plaintiff go to the general proposition that where the subject matter is within
the scope of the action and relevant to the issues, the
matter is res adjudicata. This we concede, and we readily concede further that plaintiff's

~ight

and title to the

growing crops thereon was and is res adjudicata. However, the case at bar involves and effects the rights of the
parties under facts and sitttations arising after the entry
of the de-cree and which could not be and were not adjudi-

cated in the previous action to quiet title.
Defendant believes his previous argument and
authorities covers the situation, and several cases cited
by the defendant are identical in principle with the situa- tion before this Court.
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S . CONTENTION
THAT "POSSESSION OF PREMISES AT TIME
CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL AS DEFENDANTS RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE
BARR·ED BY STATUTE."
Defendants believe that this argument of the plaintiff is identical with the .contention of plaintiff that defendants' rights in th~ crop are res adjudicata. In that
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eYent "·hat "'"e said in ans". er to such argument will suffice here.
If the argument of the plaintiff under this subhead
does not encompass the matter of res adjudicata, then
frankly, defendants do not know or understand what the
plaintiff is talking· about or driYing· at .

.A.XS'\TER TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION
THAT "POSSESSION OF PREMISES BY DEFENDANTS AT TIME CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL
.A_S DEFEXD.A_NTS' RIG·HTS AND CLAI!1S IN CROP
WERE LOST AND BARRED BY PLAINTIFF'S
TAKING POSSESSION O:B-, PREMISES WHILE
CROP GROWING THEREON .."
The matters respecting plai:utiff's re-entry are better set forth, without interpretation of the parties, in the
trial court's · Finding No. 8 (Record _Page 48) than the
plaintiff sets them out with his own peculiar and slanted
interpretation.
It will be observed that the plaintiff's actions on said
land, which we hardly consider a legal entry, was without any writ of possession or any other legal right ~hat
ever, and in the temporary absence of the defendants or
any legal representatives of the defendants. It was also
between the time when the decree quieting title was entered and the statutory time within which defendant
might apply for a stay of execution and furnish a supersedeas bond.
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If such an entry would change the status of the parties it would render nugatory the provisions of Section
104-41-11, U. C. A. 1943, and would make it necessary
during such period to guard the property day and night
to prevent the prevailing party from taking possession
during the temporary absence of the los_ing party. This
we cannot believe is the law.
and his representatives was wrongful. Paxton v. Dearand his representatives was wrongful Paxton v .. Dearden, 94 Utah 149, 76 Pac. (2d) 561). The defendants had
the right of possession under the stay of execution which
awarded that right to the defendants, and regardless of
what caused the plaintiff not to press his- claim to possession, the fact remains he would have been and could
have been evicted under the stay of execution.

ANSWER TO PL.AINTIFF 'S CONTENTION
THAT "EFFECT O:B., SlJPERSEDEAS BOND IS
SOLELY TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUD~
MENT AND DOES NOT NULLIFY, VOID OR SUSPEND THE JUDG]\1ENT.''
Once again the plaintiff's argument leaves the defendants in doubt as to what he is talking about. Certainly the defendants do not understand the application
of the argument to the cas~ ~t bar.
It may be that what plaintiff intends to argue again
revolves around his ·oft~repeated contention th~t the title
and right of the parties in the crop are res adjudicata~
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but if this be so defendants again observe that the decree
quieting title did not adjudicate the rights of the parties
to the seYered crops after they had been cultivated to
maturity, harvested and sold, all acts arising after the
entry of the decree and 'vhile the defendants were legally
in possession of the premises and the growing crops
thereon under a stay of execution.

AN"SWER TO PL...~INTIFF'S CONTENTION
THAT "ACTION IN TROVER FOR CONVERSION
OR IX X.A.TURE OF ACTION ON THE CASE."
In this portion of his argument, plaintiff again presupposes that he was and is the owner of the severed
crop, which is not the fact and contrary to the authorities.
Defendants further call this Court's attention to the
fact that under such authorities previously cited we find
that title to severed crops vested in the defendants upon
severance, and it is elementary that conversion does not
lie for appropriation of and dominion over one's own
property.

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION
THAT "DISPOSAL OF SUBJECT OF ACTION
PENDING APPEAL IS CONTEMPT OF BOTH
TRIAL AND APPELL-6-~TE COURTS.''
Defendants might find much to argue about if they
were before this court charged with contempt. Since such
a proceeding or matter is not before this Court - since the
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defendants are not charged with contempt, we see nothing
to be said ·further.

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION
TH1\T "AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES ERRONEOUS WHERE PLAINTIFF CLEARLY ENTITLED
TO SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.''
Plaintiff argues that ''in the case at bar it is clearly
established that plaintiff was and is entitled to be com-·
pensated for the crop of grain * * *" and that such compensation should be for the high market value of the
wheat.''
He presupposes that he is entitled to such damages,
and that was the very matter before the t:rial court ·and
the very matter to be determined .by this Court. Defendants have heretofore arg·ued and cited authorities to the
effect that the highest fluctuating market value of the
wheat is not the proper
measure of damages, and that
,
there was and is no competent evidence showing that
plaintiff is entitled to recover anything. We refer this
Court to our main argument, and will refrain from needless repetition here.

ANSWER TO PIJAINTIFF'S CONTENTION
THAT ''PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES BY REASON OF THE "\VILLFUL, WANTON, MALICIOUS AND WRONGFUL NATURE OF
DEF]JNDANTS' ACTION.''
The plaintiff again presupposes and states as a fact
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'
that the defendants' nctions "~ere willful, wanton, malicious and wrongful. This is contrary to the trial court's
Finding of Fact No. 13 (Record Page No. 49), said finding being as follo"\YS :
"'That the defendant J. George J'ones, Jr. was
and is not guilty of any evil motive or malicious
conduct either in pursuing his appeal to the Su~
preme Court as aforesaid, or in procuring a stay
of execution, or in remaining in possession of said
premises pending such appeal, or- in the harvesting
and disposal of said crop of grain.''
Defendants are willing to rest on the authorities
cited by plaintiff in this regard, to which they add the
following· authorities :
25 C. J. S. Damages, Sec. 119, Page 715.
25 C. J. S. Damages, Sec. 123 (sub "b"), Page
722.
It seems rather obvious, aside from the findings of
the trial court, that plaintiff negatives the idea of exemplary damages when he admits and the record shows the
defendants remained in possession under a stay of execution which gave them that right.

CONCLUSION
His lack of competent proof as to damages did not
take the plaintiff by surprise. He had ample advance
notice of the law of the case, the views of the trial court,
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and even the views of this Court. Everything that is here
stated was said to this Court and admitted by the plaintiff at an argument on an appeal which was taken by the
plaintiff from an order of the trial court sustaining a
demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint. We believe that facts stated and admitted before this very
Court are matters of which this Court may take cognizance and are matters which may be stated in this brief.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the amended
complaint stating in said order, among other matters, the
following:

'' * * * the court having duly considered the
same and being of the opinion that said amended
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action except for nominal damages
* * *." (Record Page 32).
The appeal of plaintiff from that order is not reported, since the case was merely remanded to the trial
court. Day v. Jones, No. 7288. (Record Page No. 38).
At the argument on that demurrer the trial court
suggested to plaintiff that if he felt he was entitled to
damages in the amount of the highest peak value of the
wheat, he should file an amended complaint incorporating a second cause of action with allegations respecting
the measure of damages which defendants felt plaintiff
might be entitled and which the trial court felt was the
proper measure of damages. Rather than file an amend-
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ed complaint following such suggestion he appealed, and
the cause 'Yas remanded as stated.
At the lengthy and informal arg·ument before this
Court in chambers on that appeal, two members of this
Yery Court suggested to the plaintiff that he do the very
thing the trjal court advised. Despite the fact that the
trial court and this Court 'vent to great lengths in making such sugg·estions the plaintiff 'vould not ·follow them,
but on the contrary 'vent to trial upon the theory that he
''as entitled to the highest peak value of the wheat, a~d
" . .as entitled to exemplary damages, and not one whit
less; that he was not going to be_ content with any smaller
and legal measure of damages.
Under such circumstances plaintiff cannot say that
he was ignorant of the proper measure of damages; that
he was not apprised of the holdings of the authorities;
that he was not afforded more than ample opportunity
to recover what he was entitled to recover.
The trial court held that he was not entitled to the
highest peak value of the crop of wheat, and that in the
absence of any competent proof of damages he wa·s entitled to nominal damages and no more. Defendants
urge that under the circumstances the trial court's ruling
dismissing the action as to Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr. and
awarding plaintiff nominal damages against J. George
Jones, Jr. was correct, and no other judgment could possibly have been entered.
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For the reasons in this brief set forth the judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
CLINE, wILSON & CLINE,

J ttorn,eys tor Defendants

and Respondents.
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